2 The rule is named for two Supreme Court cases most commonly cited as delineating it. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) , the Court excluded confessions obtained from several defendants after a prearraignment detention apparently lasting several days marked by periods of prolonged questioning on the ground that this procedure violated the predecessor statute to Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That statute directed that arrestees be brought before a committing magistrate without unnecessary delay. In a controversial opinion, the Court held that convictions based on evidence obtained through "such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of the law." Id. at 345.
In Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), the Court attempted to clarify the question of what constituted an unnecessary delay under Rule 5(a). Police arrested and detained Andrew Mallory for approximately eight hours before attempting to locate a committing magistrate. The Court reversed lower court rulings of admissibility, holding that, while time may be taken to "book" a suspect, id. at 454, a delay for the sole purpose of interrogation where a committing magistrate is readily accessible constituted "willful disobedience of the law." Id. at 453.
The confusion and controversy surrounding federal McNabb-Mallo cases have been well documented elsewhere and are not the main concern of this comment. Among the most comprehensive discussions of the problems and developments surrounding the 12 the Supreme Court declared that a confession obtained by federal officials during a prearraignment delay' 3 in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and its predecessor statute' 4 was excludible from be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided; That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate or other officer. 9 See text accompanying notes 133-44 in/ia. 10 See text accompanying notes 145-216 in/ra. 11 318 U.S. 382. 12 See note 2 supra. 13 For the purposes of this comment, "prearraignment delay" will refer to the time elapsing between arrest and the initial appearance of an arrested individual before a committing official. Other labels for such an appearance used in various jurisdictions include "presentment," "preliminary hearing," and "preliminary examination." In the federal context, the term should not be confused with the "arraignment" procedure mandated by Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 338 n.2-a (D.C. Cir. 1960).
14 Rule 5(a) and the rest of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure actually were not adopted until the year following McNabb. In Malloqy, however, the Court characterized Rule 5(a) as a "compendious restatement, without substantive change, of several prior statutory provisions" upon which it had relied in MciVabb. 354 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added). The Court probably included this statement to quell controversy arising over the effect of the adoption of Rule 5(a) when, soon after McNabb, the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court on Criminal Rules dropped proposed Rule 5(b) from its Final Draft. Proposed Rule 5(b) read: "No statement made by a defendant in response to interrogation by an officer or agent of the government shall be inadmissible in evidence against him if the interrogation occurs while the defendant is held in custody in violation of this rule." The statement in Malloq thus coun-evidence at trial, regardless of the confession's voluntariness.' 5 Rule 5 (a) requires that an arrested individual be brought before the nearest available committing magistrate without unnecessary delay. 16 Under what will hereinafter be called the pure federal rule, the nature and purpose of the delay, rather than its effect on the defendant, was determinative of exclusion.' 7 In McNabb the Court invoked the exclusionary rule to help enforce compliance with (or at least discourage disregard for) Rule 5(a)'s predecessor. Justice Frankfurter noted that such legislation "requiring that the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons. . . .outlaws easy but self-defeating ways in which brutality is substituted for brains as an instrument of crime detection."' 8 tered the implication that, by approving the Rules without 5(b), the Supreme Court had backed away from its McNabb holding.
15 Before McNabb, delay had little direct effect on the admissibility of a confession obtained during the prearraignment period. Pre-McNabb confessions needed only to pass constitutional muster as embodied in the due process test of voluntariness. See text accompanying notes 140-47 infra. Under this analysis, the courts examined the "totality of the circumstances" in which the confession was obtained in order to ascertain whether it was "coerced" or the product of an "overborne will." Id. See also Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) , and Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) . The suspect's age, education, mental or physical condition, and previous experience with the criminal justice system are examples of pertinent circumstances. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191. Police conduct also weighs heavily in the analysis. Torture, deprivation of food or sleep, isolation, and promises of leniency, each might render a resulting confession involuntary and therefore inadmissible. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) . Usually courts cited the presence of several factors in combination as constituting an improper totality, but a single, extreme circumstance, such as beatings or prolonged, incessant questioning sessions, might alone suffice. Id.
Prior to McNabb, prolonged prearraignment delay was another circumstance to weigh, carrying no more weight than other factors. For this reason, McNabb elicited surprise and protest from law enforcement circles. See Inbau, sufira note 2. See also Hendrickson v. State, 93 Okla. Crim. App. 379, 398-400, 229 P.2d 196, 205-07 (1951) .
16 At the time ofiMalloy, Rule 5(a) read: An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a magistrate or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith. The wording of this rule has since changed, but its fundamental meaning has not. See 18 U.S.C. Rule 5(a) (1975) .
The function of Rule 5(a) is twofold. First, it is cautionary. During the arrestee's appearance, the magistrate apprises him, inter alia, of the charge against him and of his rights to silence and counsel. Second, it is preventive, as it expresses a policy disfavoring lengthy prearraignment detention prior to neutral judicial examination of the grounds for holding the suspect. Implicitly, this minimizes the opportunity for police misconduct toward the suspect. Nearly every state has enacted a statute similar to Rule 5(a) restricting prearraignment detention. 32 The precise terms vary by jurisdiction, although the term "without unnecessary delay" is the most common.
33 Some statutes place a specific time limit on such delay. 30 Kamisar, supra note I, at 183. The federal courts inconsistently interpret the effect and intended interaction of various provisions of the statute. For example, a finding of involuntariness, based solely on a delay of over six hours is arguably permissible under the statute despite the language prohibiting the exclusion of a confession solely on the grounds of delay. 32 See statutes cited in notes 33-34 infra. 33 The following statutes or rules specify that an arrestee be brought before a committing magistrate or similar official "without unnecessary delay," "with reasonable promptness," or similar terms: ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8. 1 ALA. CODE § 15-10-7(e) (1975) specifies that an arrestee is to be taken before a committing official "forthwith" by a police officer after an initial arrest has been made by a private citizen.
VA The causation form of the McNabb-Mallog rule, as illustrated by the approaches of Michigan and Wisconsin, is a schizophrenic rule. On the one hand, an exclusionary rule based solely on delay is adopted, while on the other exclusion applies only when the defendant proves a causal connection between the delay and the challenged confession. This approach contains the seeds of its own dissolution and results from judicial reluctance to apply the pure federal rule to voluntary confessions. Michigan's experience with McNabb-Mallo is illustrative.
Michigan. The Hamilton Rule
At least some justices on the Michigan Supreme Court thought they were adopting the pure federal rule in the unanimous decision in People v. Hamilton .50 In that case a nineteen-year-old murder defendant who could not speak English was held incommunicado for three days prior to arraignment, during which police periodically interrogated him and repeatedly denied his attorney access to him. The court found this delay violated Michigan's delay statute, which required an arrestee to be brought before a judicial officer "without unnecessary delay. ' 54 This remark exacerbated the confusion by invoking the state constitution as part of the basis for statutory exclusion. Furthermore, the court's use of terms like "renders involuntary" and "sweating" 5 5 a confession left the possible impression that qualifying confessions were excluded where events during the delay induced the confession, and that insufficient evidence of causation would defeat an attempt at exclusion.
An alternate interpretation of Hamilton requires only that the delay be prolonged and that the delay's purpose, rather than its effect, is to induce a confession. A confession occurring during such a delay would be excluded regardless of whether it actually was induced: in essence, the pure federal rule. This reading would make the phrase "renders involuntary" anomalous unless it is read to connote a legal conclusion unaffected by any rebutting evidence of voluntariness. This reading finds support in the court's professed intent to bring Michigan into line with the Supreme Court and the federal rule.
In any event, this ambiguity probably produced the unanimity of decision in the case; certainly later attempts to clarify it caused a sharp division of the court. In the 1962 case of People v. McCager, the court reaffirmed its adoption of the federal McNabb-Malloq rule in Hamilton.56
The first real split in the court over Hamilton's effect on voluntary confessions occurred in the 1963 case of People v. Walker. 57 Police held the defendant for two days prior to his production in court on a habeas corpus writ. The court dismissed the writ. Walker's confession had occurred four days after the dismissal of the writ while he was still in custody. Nine days after his arrest, he was finally taken for a preliminary hearing. By a four-to-four decision, the court upheld the admission of [Vol. 72 and its importance in the conviction. Since Hamilton, the Michigan Supreme Court has not once invoked the case to exclude a confession.
In 1968, the court in People v. Farmer 66 introduced a restricted formulation of the Hamilton rule although it purported to follow precedent. The new statement of the rule focused on a lack of coercive circumstances to determine that the purpose of a seventy-two-hour delay was not improper. The important circumstance was that a physician had examined and questioned the suspect concerning his treatment at the hands of the police soon after confessing; thus the court found that lack of coercion, rather than lack of interrogative purpose, took the confession out from under Hamilton.67 In a questionable use of precedent to support its decision, the court cited the remanding opinion in Ubbes, but quoted Justice Souris' dissenting characterization of the facts!6a In 1974, the Michigan court eliminated any lingering notion that Hamilton operated independently of a delay's effect on the challenged confession, thus providing some protection supplemental to the voluntariness test. In People v. White 6 9 the court, citing Farmer, unanimously held that a confession given after a delay of thirty-four hours "was not the product of a police interrogation. ' 70 The court said that Hamilton applied "only where the delay has been used as a tool to extract a statement." ' 7 ' This formulation of the rule is so conceptually similar to the voluntariness test that, in effect, Michigan is back where it started. 72 Five years after Michigan, Wisconsin embarked on a similar experiment.
Wisconsin: The Phillips Rule
The Wisconsin experience with delay exclusion resembles Michigan's in that its test for an unreasonable delay, as applied, was indistinguishable from a voluntariness or coercion test. allowable interrogation of a suspect arrested without a warrant to that which was "for the express purpose of determining whether to release the suspect or. .. to make a formal complaint. '74 The court reasoned that legitimate interrogation of a person arrested upon a warrant was more limited because the warrant "would seem to presuppose sufficient evidence and its purpose is to cause the arrested person to be brought before a magistrate. ' 75 Detention for a longer period rendered inadmissible any confession obtained during the unreasonable portion 76 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has never used Philhos to exclude a confession; in Phillps itself the confession was admitted under the test promulgated by the court. 77 Despite repeated declarations that the voluntariness of a confession is not the issue under Phillips, 78 examination of the factors used to determine the reasonableness of delays in later cases belies the disclaimers. In State v. Schoffer, 79 the court said that "[t]he readiness of [the defendant]. . . to give information about a large number of crimes affects the determination of reasonableness of the delay." The kinds of confessions excludible under Philh'ps purportedly are those obtained where police delay in order to "sew up" 80 a conviction or arrest; yet in Krueger v. State 8 ' the court refused to exclude a confession even though police had sufficient evidence to charge the defendant before he confessed some fourteen hours after his arrest. "The question revolves solely on the point whether the delay is inordinate and the detention illegal," declared the court. 82 But again, in later cases, the criteria for inordinate or illegal delay resembled those for voluntariness. For example, in Wagner v. State 83 the court reasoned that "the police did not detain Wagner in order to subject him to a strong inquisitorial attack, 74 Id. at 534, 139 N.W.2d at 47. 75 Id. This reasoning is curious in that it requires a conclusion that judicial examination of the grounds for detention is less urgent when the court has made no predetention determination of probable cause. Recognizing these basic inconsistencies, the court in Klonowski v. State reviewed the Ph'l/~s line of cases and wrote:
While these cases indicate that any confessions made during an unreasonably long detention are inadmissible, there are cases stating that the purpose of the rule is to prevent an accused from having his resistance weakened by the psychological coercion of being detained and "worked upon" by the police to secure evidence.
8 6
Citing the "extraction" test from the Michigan cases on Mcabb-Mal1oy, 8 7 the court concluded that the confession at hand, obtained after a twenty-four-hour delay, was "not subject to the exclusionary rule under Philhzs for two reasons: First, it was a volunteered statement. . . and second, it was not the result of the defendant's being 'worked upon' by the officers in order to obtain a 'sew up' confession." 88 In effect, the court held that no confession was excludible under Phillips unless it was also excludible under the voluntariness test, i.e., the delay or police conduct during the delay must have caused the confession. 89 In both Michigan and Wisconsin, the introduction of a causal requirement diluted their versions of McNabb-Mallo7 to meaningless dicta. A reading of the cases suggests that the primary corrosive force was judicial reluctance to exclude voluntary confessions. Whether this was based on a concern for public or legislative response, or for effective law enforcement, at base the price was simply too high when it came time to 864 (1972) , where the court noted that "Postarrest detention should be permitted as long as the purpose is reasonable and the period of detention is not unjustifiably long." The court carefully examined and upheld the reasonableness of separate portions of a two-day delay. One 15-hour segment of interrogation was "reasonable" because, although the police had insufficient evidence to charge the defendant, they might have jogged his memory regarding the identity of other suspects. The more probable purpose of the delay was to "break" the defendant's alibi. 
MONTANA
Any meaningful application of Mcdabb-Malloy must exclude a causation requirement. Exclusion must be based on a violation of the applicable delay statute per se. If the statute provides specific time limits, implementation is easy. But if the standard is "unnecessary" or "unreasonable" delay, administrative problems arise. These terms, with their myriad legal connotations and definitions, present a dilemma to police officers on the street. Naturally the policeman will desire a particular time period within which he may safely question a suspect to obtain a voluntary confession. Such a guide would provide certainty to enhance the interrogative process generally. It also ensures that some voluntary confessions that might have been obtained afterwards will never occur. However, an adopting state must be willing to tolerate this.
Delaware: The Vorhauer and Webster Rules
One place to find a logical cut-off point for permissible delay is the delay statute itself. Because any objective limit will be arbitrary, a court might well look for guidance to the legislative standards set forth in the statute it purports to enforce. The Delaware Supreme Court did this in the 1965 case of Vorhauer v. State. 9° Delaware's delay statute mandates that "every person arrested shall be brought before a magistrate without unreasonable delay, and in any event he shall, if possible, be so brought within 24 hours of arrest ... ."91 In Vorhauer, the court concluded that a confession obtained more than twenty-four hours after arrest was automatically inadmissible, noting that the exclusionary rule is "the most practical and effective means" to enforce the statute. 92 [Vol. 72 the twenty-four-hour mark, but after an "unreasonable" delay, were similarly excludible. The court said there were "no clear cut standards of reasonableness" and emphasized that the question was strictly evidentiary, to be decided solely by the trial judge in each case.
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The court offered few clues as to where the judge should look in making that determination. However, one clue is that the Webster court allowed a confession obtained more than four hours after the arrest, largely on the grounds that the police treated the suspect well during that time. They spent a large part of the delay complying with requests of the accused. 95 Webster indicates that police conduct plays an important part in the reasonableness of a pre-twenty-four-hour delay, and that a court will scrutinize such actions for coercive impact. 96 In Fullman v. State 97 the court approved a twenty-one-hour delay and admitted the resulting confession where part of the delay was attributable to the defendant's request for a polygraph examination, and where "an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual trust permeated the surroundings." 9 8 Again the pertinent circumstances were those indicating the presence or absence of undue pressure or mistreatment. Thus the door is open in Delaware for dilution of the rule to the causation form for delays of less than twenty-four hours. 99 As for the automatic twenty-four-hour rule, no qualifying cases have been reported at the appellate level since Vorhauer. Either Delaware police have had little difficulty coping with the requirement, or those cases where problems have arisen have not prompted reconsideration of the rule by an appellate court. 1978) , the court declared that a customary eight-hour delay for all drunken driving arrestees was unreasonable although the custom stemmed from a desire to prevent the defendant from being prejudiced by his drunken demeanor in court. Coerciveness was not a factor in the decision. The court perceived the uniform delay to be unreasonable because of its arbitrariness, and required that in each case the arresting officer take the arrestee before a judge as soon as he reasonably deemed the danger of in-court prejudice to be minimal, i.e., when the defendant sobered sufficiently to protect his own interests. The court remanded the case for a determination of the reasonableness of the eight-and-one-half-hour delay in Warren's arraignment to decide the admissibility of statements he made during that time.
See 
1981]

Mayland The Johnson Rule
Maryland, where prearraignment delay is limited to twenty-four hours by a rule of court, l°° adopted an exclusionary rule identical to Delaware's in 1978. After the most thorough examination of the delay problem made in any recent state decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled in Johnson v. State' 0 l that any confession obtained after the statutory period was inadmissible "irrespective of the reason for the delay." Practices justifying a shorter delay included administrative procedures, determination of whether to issue a charging document, verification of the commission of the crime, procurement of information to avert harm to persons or property, and obtaining nontestimonial information as to the identity or location of other persons involved in the offense.' 0 2 The court rejected the majority approach of the states:
To say that an unlawful postponement of the initial appearance may be merely a factor in assessing the admissibility of a statement, is to imply that an unnecessary delay may be overlooked entirely if other indicia of voluntariness exist. Under this analysis, even a gross violation of the presentment requirement may be disregarded altogether .. . . Despite its relatively popular acceptance, therefore, the voluntariness standard is a hopelessly inadequate means of safeguarding a defendant's right to prompt presentment. 103 The court also perceived that the Michigan form of MNabb-Malloy was "merely a reformulation of the voluntariness test."' 0 4
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Orth contended that the majority's ruling bestowed full constitutional import to the right of an arrestee to be promptly taken before a judicial officer. It makes the right the equivalent of the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination ...
[T]he most eFective protection of a nonconstitutional right is not the sole goal of criminal justice. There is also to be considered the protection of the right of society to have a person who has committed offenses against 100 MD. DIsT. R. 723(a) (Supp. 1978) read:
A defendant who is detained pursuant to an arrest shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay and in no event later than the earlier of (1) 24 hours after arrest or (2) the first session of court after the defendant's arrest upon a warrant or, where an arrest has been made without a warrant, the first session of court after the charging document has been filed. A charging document shall be filed promptly after arrest if not already filed. The 1980 supplement version of the Maryland District Rule is more succinct: "A defendant who is detained pursuant to an arrest shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay and in no event later than 24 hours after arrest. A charging document shall be filed promptly after arrest if not already filed." MD. DIsT 107 The excerpt below poignantly reflects the agonized tone of a judge forced to apply a rule he simply cannot condone:
Even assuming the delay was intentionally contrived to elicit the culpatory remark, the sanction of suppressing the truth is hard tojustify as proper punishment for the tardiness in formally [judicially] apprising appellant why he was being held. In light of the completely voluntary nature of the admission of such despicably cruel conduct to a six-yearold child, the equal dispensation of procedural rights for technical rule violations is not always understandable. But justice must be equally dispensed, not distributed selectively. Despite its appearance of burning the barn to get rid of the mice, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for retrial. 
Pennsylvania: From the Futch Rule to the Davenport Rule
Pennsylvania's delay statute does not specify a maximum hour limit, but rather prohibits "unnecessary" delay. 114 
116 In Commonwealth v. Williams, 117 the court refined the Futch analysis to three steps: the delay must be unnecessary, the evidence must be prejudicial, and the incriminating evidence must be related to the delay. The Williams decision went further to declare that "prearraignment delay will always be unnecessary unless justified by administrative processing-fingerprinting, photographing and the like." '1 18 Still the test was so general that defendants flooded the court's docket with appeals seeking judicial examination of the necessariness of prearraignment detentions."19
The court bowed to the pressure for a consistent way to administer the rule in the 1977 case of Commonwealth v. Davenport confessions obtained during or after a prearraignment delay of more than six hours are automatically excluded. 12 ' For shorter delays, the court did not bother with an illusory reasonableness standard, but rather held that "prearraignment delay shall not be grounds for sup-. pression of such statements except as may be relevant to constitutional standards of admissibility." ' 122 Breaking with all precedent, the court declared that the significant period to measure was that between arrest and arraignment, not between arrest and confession. Justice Roberts explained: This rule was adopted not simply to guard against the coercive influence of custodial interrogation, but to ensure that the rights to which an accused is entitled at preliminary arraignment are afforded without unnecessary delay. . . . T]he exclusion. . . of statements made during the illegal delay in producing a person before a magistrate. . . is premised not only on the possible coercive effect of the delay itself, but on the postponing of the additional rights which attach on production.12 3 Under this rule, even confessions given well within a reasonable period, such as during administrative processing, are exlcuded if the total prearraignment period exceeded six hours.
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Davenport applied only to prospective arrests, and no post-Davenport arrests have been reported in appellate cases to date. Although this exceedingly strict rule has yet to be tested, the court hinted at some flexibility in a footnote: "We recognize that it is difficult to fix any time limit. Nevertheless, we conclude that it is desirable to set such a standard, and that six hours provides a workable rule which can readily be complied with in the absence of exigent circumstances.' 1 25 As the court begins working with the rule, where and how it recognizes such exigent circumstances will shape its future effectiveness.
Pennsylvania's experience suggests that the successful administration of McNabb-Mallor requires a specific time limit. Yet in the same year Pennsylvania established such a limit, Montana adopted McNabbAalloy without one. 121 To support its choice of this particular time period, the court cited § 4.5 of the Correc- 129 The court did, however, suggest a series of steps for challenging a confession under Benbo. The defendant must show that unnecessary delay occurred (unnecessariness being a function of the arresting officer's diligence and the time elapsing before arraignment), then the prosecution must prove the delay was not reasonably related to the confession to avoid exclusion.' 30 The court then excluded statements made by the arrested defendant while he spent several days helping police locate incriminating evidence and where no effort was made to take the defendant before a judge as required by statute.131
After Benbo, Montana is in a unique position to test McNabb-Malo1y. The retention of a reasonable relationship requirement may erode the rule into a causation form. The reliance on Pennsylvania precedent, however, may lead Montana to promulgate a time limit, such as that in 894 (1977) . 127 "While the length of the time between arrest and initial appearance is not determinative of the 'necessity' of the delay, it is a factor to be considered." 174 Mont. at 262, 570 P.2d at 900.
128 REv. MONT. CODE § § 95-901(a), 95-603(d) (3) (1947) require that an arrested person be brought before the nearest and most accessible judge without unnecessary delay.
129 Although no appellate case has implemented Benbo, the supreme court suggested that the rule might have applied in State v. Lenon, 174 Mont. 264,570 P.2d 901 (1977) , where the accused was arrested midnight Friday, confessed at nine a.m. Saturday, and was arraigned Monday morning. The police tried several times to contact one justice of the peace but found he was out of town. They did not seek out any of the other competent officials in the vicinity. The court held that this delay would be unnecessary, but that, in failing to show that another justice of the peace was available at the time, the defense had not made a proper case for suppression of the confession. Id. at 275, 570 P.2d at 908. 1050, 1054 (1980) , where the court dismissed a criminal charge on the basis of an unexplained 14-day delay in arraignment. The court based its decision on due process, however, and carefully limited the holding to the facts of that case, which involved a misdemeanor offense.
[Vol. 72 though, as yet, confessions are not so excluded." 4 A Connecticut statute 41 seemingly incorporates McNabb-Mallo requirements for the admissibility of a confession, although it is generally disregarded.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court recently issued an ominous decision on the effect of a delay violation, with a special concurrence urging that an unexplained 57-hour delay per se warranted exclusion of a resulting confession. 1 43 For the majority, which remanded the case for an explanation of the delay, the determining factor was a prior Miranda violation, possibly exacerbated by the delay.' 44 Still, delay-based exclusion was definitely countenanced.
In deciding whether to adopt McNabb-Malloy, state courts must consider some questions. What would adoption add to existing constitutional doctrines? What costs and obstacles will adoption place on law enforcement? Should a court be making such a consequential policy decision based on implied legislative intent?
A. MCNABB-MALLORY AND THE CONSTITUTION TODAY Even adoption of a meaningful form of McNab-Malloy---exclusion
based solely on the illegality of a delay and unrelated to the voluntariness of the challenged confession-is of questionable value. In light of the monumental changes in constitutional doctrines after McNabb and Mallog, were decided, little new is accomplished by adoption of the rule.
To begin with, a confession must be voluntary under the due proc- (1964). In Culombe v. Connecticut, Justice Frankfurter suggested a three-tier analysis to determine the voluntariness of a confession: determination of the physical events surrounding the confession, the psychological state of the defendant, and the legal conclusions to be drawn from these conclusions and precedent. That this analysis provided an inadequate guide is evident from the fact that the dissenters agreed on this test, but disagreed as to the conclusion it led to on the facts of the case. 367 U.S. 568, 603, 642 (1960 , that the term "involuntary" was "convenient shorthand" for a "complex of values," including concern for the "likelihood that the confession is untrue,. . . the preservation of the individual's freedom ofwill," and the "feeling that police must obey the law while enforcing the law." Professor Inbau has suggested that whether "voluntariness" or "trustworthiness" is the more appropriate standard, the practical effect of each on the same fact situations will produce the same conclusion regarding admissibility. See F. INBAU & J. REID the rule provides for a blanket exclusion. The ground for exclusion is statutory and procedural, "quite apart from the Constitution." 5 0 Some commentators have suggested that the operation of the rule creates an irrebuttable presumption of involuntariness. 151 While the effect is the same, such a characterization is misleading. As the experiences of Michigan and Wisconsin show, the concept can lead to the creation of exceptions in the absence of "real," "reasonable," or "causal" relationships between the delay and challenged confession. 152 The McNabb-Malloy principle was an enforcement tool for delay statutes, not for the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Its history clearly indicates an intent to establish a threshold for exclusion that is lower and different in kind from the voluntariness test: lower because delay alone is dispositive, and different in kind because the trustworthiness-voluntariness of the confession itself plays no part in its exclusion.
Even voluntary confessions are inadmissible unless the confessor knowingly waives his rights to silence and counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments. 1 53 The police must advise arrested individuals of these rights and secure a valid waiver before any confession induced by custodial interrogation may be used.' 54 Before the Miranda decision, courts considered the absence of such warnings or waiver as merely a factor in the voluntariness analysis. 155 Not until the preliminary hearing was an arrested person certain to receive the warnings. 156 152 See text accompaying notes 50-89 supra. 153 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court held that, prior to the custodial interrogation of criminal suspects, police officers must advise them of their rights to silence and counsel, and of the consequences of waiver before any statement resulting from the interrogation is admissible at trial. Once these rights are invoked, the police must cease questioning. The magistrate shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him and of any affidavit filed therewith, of his right to retain counsel, of his right to request the assignment of counsel if he is unable to obtain counsel, and of his right to have a preliminary delay in the hearing represented a potential delay in informing a suspect of his rights. For the most part, Miranda obliterated this basis for McNabb-Malloy. Yet several authorities continue to advance the warning rationale because of a belief that a neutral party, not the police, should advise a suspect of his rights and secure the waiver. 157 This argument carries little weight, however, because a judicial officer must always review the circumstances surrounding the giving and waiving of Miranda rights, with the burden of proving validity on the government, before a resultant confession will be admitted into evidence at trial.' 5 8 Furthermore, Miranda warnings will not save even a voluntary confession if it is obtained during illegal detention. 159 If police detain a person without probable cause merely to question him, the product of the detention is nonetheless inadmissible. 6 0 In the final analysis, then, McNabb-Malloy affects only voluntary confessions by persons arrested upon probable cause who knowingly and voluntarily waive their rights to silence and counsel after being warned of the consequences of such a waiver. The exclusion of such evidence costs society dearly. The benefits of such exclusion should plainly warrant their expense. Logically the benefits should lie in the bases for delay statutes, or in the rationale for Mcabb-Malloy as an enforcement tool for those statutes.
In their classic defense of McNabb-Mallo,7, Professors Hogan and Snee suggested these objectives behind the enforcement of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
(1) arrests on suspicion, an intolerable invasion of the citizen's fundamental right to liberty, are prevented; (2) the rights accorded one accused of crime are saved from subversion; (3) the substance of the accusatorial system of criminal justice is preserved; (4) resort to third degree tactics is made impossible. York virtually eliminated the pick-up for questioning. 163 An officer of the law must advise the accused of his rights, and counsel is available to him upon request.'64 Despite the optimistic contentions of Professors Hogan and Snee, resort to third-degree tactics will never be impossible so long as the courts recognize the necessity for interrogation at all.
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The only realistic way to attack the third degree consistently with the security needs of society is to train the police, not free the guilty.'
The protection ofjudicial integrity constitutes an independent basis for McNabb-Mallog'. Again, Hogan and Snee put it best in detailing the "real roots" of the MNabb-Malloy rule:
Trials which are the outgrowth or fruit of the Government's illegality debase the processes of justice. They cannot be countenanced in any nation which expects its citizens to esteem those processes. It is important that the trial demonstrate the guilt of the accused, but it is important also that it not disclose the criminality of the accuser.'
This same argument appears in many decisions on the admissibility of evidence obtained through constitutional violations by police. 166 The cure for third degree abuses is not in rules of exclusion of voluntary confessions but in improved personnel and facilities for police forces so that character and efficiency and scientific methods rather than brutality will be used to obtain evidence. If an officer is so stupid and brutal as to use third-degree methods, he will do so, despite rules of exclusion of voluntary confessions .... Id. at 461.
167 Hogan & Snee, supra note 2, at 32. In contrast, Professor Kamisar has argued that the "basic thrust of the McNabb-AMalloqy rule. . . is to bypass conflicts over the nature of secret interrogation and to minimize both the 'temptation' and the 'opportunity' to obtain coerced confessions." Kamisar, supra note 143, at 739-40. Hogan and Snee preferred to distinguish between the coercion concern (which they attributed to Rule 5(a)) and the integrity concern (which they associated with [Vol. 72 the peace of mind resulting from the assertion of this abstract principle subsides when constitutionally valid confessions fall under McNabb-Mallog. At some point, blanket judicial refusal to countenance even the slightest technical violation of procedural rules by police is indistinguishable in its effect from sanctioning the illegal acts of those who are freed. In the context of current constitutional protections, McNabb-Mallog passes that point. The only remaining target for the rule today is prearraignment delay by itself, unrelated to constitutional rights of an arrestee or the validity of his confession. The only beneficiaries of the application of MNabb-Malloy are the undeniedly guilty. The integrity argument reflects a concern for the public image of the courts. In this a court must look to society's sense of propriety, but it must also consider its sense of outrage. In the words of the Connecticut Supreme Court, "Society, as well as the defendant, is entitled to equal protection of the law and to due process of law."
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Even in the constitutional context, the force of the judicial integrity argument has declined. In cases such as Hams v. New York 17 0 and Stone v. Powell, 17 ' the Supreme Court has increasingly recognized that integrity of the judiciary stems from its effectiveness as well as its purity. 172 Parallel decisions on the McNabb-Mallog question in Maryland reflect this trend also. Maryland has rejected MNabb-kfalloy for confessions used for impeachment purposes. 173 In addition, Maryland defendants may not invoke MNabb-Mallog for federal habeas corpus, 174 which suggests that judicial integrity plays a limited role in the rule, even in a state ostensibly committed to its meaningful application. 172 There are several answers to the assertion that courts should exclude illegally seized evidence in order to preserve their integrity. . . .[W]hile it is quite true that courts are not to be participants in "dirty business," neither are they to be ethereal vestal virgins of another world, so determined to be like Caesar's wife, Calpurnia, that they cease to be effective forums in which both those charged with committing criminal acts and the society which makes the charge rfiay have a fair trial in which relevant competent evidence is received in order to determine whether or not the charge is true. Thus a state accomplishes little in adopting McNabb-Malloy that is not accomplished by existing constitutional doctrines. The only remaining target is delay itself and not the danger such a delay might pose to the confession-related rights of the defendant.
Of course prompt arraignment safeguards other interests of suspects, such as the determination of and opportunity to post bail and the right not to be deprived of liberty for longer than legally allowable or necessary. Excluding constitutionally valid confessions for the purpose of enforcing these rights is irrational. Even assuming such exclusion would ultimately protect all arrestees from illegal delays whether the police seek a confession or not, the costs are prohibitive and the link between the confession and the statutory violation is tenuous at best.
When evidence is seized by an illegal search, the illegality is the immediate and proximate cause which produces the evidence, but when the illegality, if any, consists merely in questioning the defendant, having failed first to take him before a magistrate, the confession, if voluntarily made, is only remotely, if at all, connected with the fact that the officer disobeyed the statute. 175 The more rational, cost-effective way to enforce delay statutes would be to punish those who violate them, not reward those who happen to confess after such a violation at society's expense. Whether this were done administratively, legislatively, or judicially, sounder results would be achieved.
B. PROBLEMS WITH ADOPTING MCNABB-M-ALLORY
McNabb-Malloy developed because of the potential for abuse during a prearraignment delay. 176 Later constitutional doctrines, however, largely have removed this danger, leaving delay as the only target of the rule. By excluding confessions for the limited, and mostly unrelated, purpose of deterring delays, courts incur important problems and costs. A major problem is administration. Courts have difficulty in determining the elements of unnecessary or unreasonable delay. Courts may be unable to draw a line that allows for considerations of individual justice and still provides sufficient certainty to serve as a guide to law enforcement officials. Such a guide may necessarily be so restrictive that it impairs effective law enforcement. Public response to the rule poses another problem which takes on added significance in state court sys- [Vol. 72 tems with an elected or periodically voter-affirmed judiciary. State courts must also examine the fundamental and practical differences between the needs and resources of law enforcement officials at state and federal levels, especially as they regard the necessity of interrogation. The reasonableness of a delay usually depends on the court's perception of its purpose. Important factors include the reasons for the delay, the conduct of officers during the delay, the likely effect of the delay upon the particular arrestee, and the length of the delay. The weight given to one factor depends largely upon the presence or absence of the other factors. due to the unavailability of a judicial officer, 184 they frown upon even brief delays for the purpose of extracting a confession from the accused before his arraignment. 18 5 The courts are tolerant of delays attributable to administrative processing, such as fingerprinting, photographing, and the like. 18 6 They generally countenance delays for arranging medical treatment of the accused, 187 for procuring necessary transportation, 188 or for satisfying conflicting demands on an officer's time, 189 provided the officers involved exercise due diligence thereafter in bringing the accused before a judicial officer.
Administen'ng the Rule
The courts have failed to draw a distinct line for delay due to interrogation of the accused. Usually, the courts sanction delays for an immediate determination of whether to release the accused. 190 Checking a suspect's story is another legitimate practice.1 9 1 But when the court de-termines that the police intended to extract a confession, it is likely to exclude the resultant confession as involuntary or as the product of unnecessary or unreasonable delay. 192 Exclusion is less likely when the accused manifests a willingness to be interrogated, such as when he requests a polygraph examination. 193 Most jurisdictions do not find that delays attributable to requests by the accused are unreasonable.
Inextricably tied up in a reasonableness determination is the conduct of officials during the delay in question, particularly when defense counsel challenges the state's asserted reason for the delay. Good treatment of the accused, 194 time allowed for sleep and consultation with relatives, and relatively little actual questioning' 95 of the suspect are all circumstances which will work against claims that the purpose of a delay is unreasonable. Conversely, intensive or violent questioning, 196 deprivation of sleep or food, and isolation 19 7 are examples of circumstances suggesting that a delay is unreasonable. The weight accorded police conduct during a delay will vary with the susceptibility of the particular suspect to coercive pressure. An individual with experience in the criminal process is less likely to be prejudiced or have his "will overborne" by delay than a first-time offender. The courts often take this factor, as well as the age and education of the accused, into account. 198 Theoretically, under MNabb-Mallory the susceptibility factor should carry little weight because the inquiry is not about voluntariness. Still, a court can infer the purpose of a delay from police conduct toward a person known to be particularly susceptible. Thus, the factor does have some limited relevance.
Length is probably the most important and least concrete determinant of a delay's reasonableness. As a general rule, the relevant period of time in measuring the length of a delay is that elapsing between arrest and confession. 199 In the overwhelming majority of states, the reasonable length of a delay is a matter entirely within the discretion of the court.
20 0 Just as a legitimate purpose, such as administrative processing, will support a long delay, a short delay will mitigate against the exclusionary impact of a questionable practice.
The law enforcement officer will find little guidance from such distinctions. Many of the important reasonableness factors are discoverable only through hindsight, leaving the officer in an untenable position. The perceptions and biases of individual trial judges may also affect the relative weight of these factors. 20 The result in the federal courts was uncertainty, not continuity, as minor factual differences distinguished cases, confusing police and other judges. Time-based exclusion makes judges, not to mention police, slaves to the clock. In adopting it, courts abdicate their judicial function and make it possible for a confessed killer to go free because someone was late.
To its credit, the time-based standard focuses on delay alone as the triggering factor. Thus it relates more directly to the remaining unaddressed concern of delay statutes, which is prearraignment delay, not confessions. However, it still relies on the exclusion of confessions as the operative enforcement device for the statute. Such an approach contains the flaws discussed previously: it deprives society of the benefit of highly probative, constitutionally valid confessions without an express legislative basis for doing so. When state legislators mean for statutory violations to affect the admissibility of confessions, they have not been hesitant to do so. Some state statutes specify that the confessions of juveniles are inadmissible if special procedures are not followed upon their arrest. 20 4 Other direct expressions of legislative intent regarding the admissibility of confessions are not unknown to the law. 20 5 The absence of an express mandate to exclude in ordinary delay statutes is therefore significant, and the courts should heed it. If McNabb-Malloy is to be adopted regardless, then the time-based standard makes the most administrative and doctrinal sense.
. Both a reasonableness version and a time-based version of McNabbMalloy involve considerable costs. The former is often unworkable, and the latter is dangerously arbitrary. In light of the insignificant remaining utility of McNabb-Mallogy with regard to confessions, the decision to incur such costs is a drastic one.
Public Response to McNabb-Mallog,
Any court must be concerned with the public reaction to its decisions. Our legal system depends on society's perception of its continued effectiveness for its survival. This is the mirror image of the judicial integrity argument put forth to support adoption of exclusionary rules, including McNabb-Malloy. 20 6 In the absence of a showing of potential coercion, the public is apt to perceive exclusion of confessions and reversals of convictions as irrational, or at least overly solicitous of the rights of a confessed criminal at the expense of society. Furthermore, such developments can breed disrespect for the law and encourage crime by making convictions less certain. 20 7 As Professor Inbau has noted:
Our civil liberties cannot exist in a vacuum. Alongside of them we must have a stable society, a safe society; otherwise there will be no medium in which to exercise such rights and liberties. To have these liberties without safety of life, limb, and property is a meaningless thing. Individual civil liberties, considered apart from their relationship to public safety, and security, are like labels on empty bottles208
Public outrage in response to adoption may have more direct effects than a long range deterioration of esteem for the judicial function or for the laws. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger responded: No one can take issue with the Brandeis thesis, but there is another side to the coin.
If a majority--or even a substantial minority-of the people in any given community. . . come to believe that law enforcement is being frustrated by what laymen call "technicalities," there develops a sour and bitter feeling that is psychologically and sociologically unhealthy.... I do not challenge these rules of law. But I do suggest that we may have come the full circle from the place where Brandeis stood, and that a vast number of people are losing respect for law and the administration of justice because they think that the Suppression Doctrine [the exclusionary rule] is defeating justice.
... [W] e must remember that the rule was made to protect the integrity of law enforcement, not to cripple it. Burger, supra note 202, at 21-22 (citing Sondern, Take the Handcuji Of Our Police!, READERS DIGEST, Sept. 1964, at 64-68).
The 16-year-old statement is certainly not outdated. Consider this 1980 news article: FEAR OF CRIME HAUNTS THE U.S. Fear of crime is as American as the Son of Sam or the Hillside Strangler. And this real anxiety, according to a new study of public attitudes in the United States, has turned more than half of the nation into a pack of cautious, gun-toting citizens who keep their doors locked and their dress inconspicuous to avoid becoming crime statistics. Four out of ten Americans surveyed say they are "highly fearful" that they will be victims of murder, robbery, rape or assault. ...
The study [a 163-page report by Research and Forecasts, Inc. of New York] also confirms other polls that show that the criminal courts have lost the respect of the public, and it indicates an increasingly strong punitive mood. NEWSWEEK [Vol. 72
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passing legislation similar to the Omnibus Crime Act. 20 9 In addition, the elected or voter-approved state judge may question whether the McNabb-Mallor principle merits the uproar where the result on procedure after legislative reversal will be nil. 2 10 Concededly, obscure legal issues seldom spark such widespread interest as to make popular acceptance an important factor in a court's decision. Yet on the federal level the McNabb-Mallogy rule was for more than twenty years the most hotly contested issue in federal criminal procedure. 21 1 The debate it inspired was intense; the arguments were of broad, emotional appeal. Senator Ervin's oft quoted remark illustrates some of the ferocity of the attack on McNabb-Mallog: "Frankly, I believe that in recent years enough has been done for those who murder, rape and rob; and that it is about time for Congress to do something for those who do not wish to be murdered, or raped, or robbed. '2 12 Of course constitutional rights of individuals should not depend on the passions of the majority. But McNabb-Mallogr involves no constitutional rights. The doctrine emanates from delay statutes, which almost never expressly mandate exclusion to enforce them. The decision to adopt has crucial consequences. Language quoted throughout this comment illustrates the controversy and acrimonious debate adoption engenders.-The heavy costs of adoption, the doubtful modem necessity for extraconstitutional exclusionary protection, and the intuitive irrationality of exclusion for reasons so unrelated to the confession itself should give a court pause before deciding a legislature intended such a result by implication. In the original McNabb decision, the Supreme Court erred, and Congress eventually abolished the rule after twenty-five years of stormy and confusing jurisprudence. State courts should learn from the federal experience.
Federal versus State Necessity for Interrogation
The Supreme Court has noted the necessity for interrogation of suspects in criminal investigations. In Culombe v. Connecticut, Justice Frankfurter, the author of the McNabb opinion, wrote:
Despite modem advances in the technology of crime detection, offenses frequently occur about which things cannot be made to speak. And where there cannot be found innocent human witnesses to such offenses, nothing remains-if police investigation is not to be balked before it has fairly be- Aug. 19, 1958) .
gun-but to seek out guilty witnesses and ask them questions, witnesses that is, who are suspected of knowing something about the offense precisely because they are suspected of implication in it.
t 3
Adoption of the rule unavoidably creates additional uncertainty or unwarranted arbitrary limits on the interrogation process. 2 14 These adverse effects affect all interrogations whether or not a court later finds that they occurred during an unreasonable delay. The Supreme Court determined that the benefits of MNabb-Mallogr outweighed these effects on the interrogation process in the federal law enforcement system, but clearly recognized that states might come to different conclusions regarding their criminal systems.
15
Federal law enforcement agencies may bring large amounts of specialized equipment and manpower to bear on fewer, more specialized crimes. The ability of federal agencies to gather circumstantial evidence reduces the importance of interrogation of suspects in solving crimes. Yet a state court might determine that local police, by the more limited capacity of their resources and the nature and number of the crimes they handle, depend on interrogation more than do their federal counterparts. 2 16 Murderers, rapists, and robbers would seem to produce less extrinsic, tangible evidence than narcotics dealers, if only because the former set of crimes generally involve fewer people and are repeated less systematically. Crimes that states prosecute, for the same reasons, may involve fewer innocent parties to serve as witnesses, increasing the need, as Justice Frankfurter noted, for the interrogation of suspects. On the basis of this need, and especially in light of the strong constitutional protections currently afforded arrested persons, a state court should consider carefully whether the effect of a McNabb-Mallory rule is too severe on state law enforcement for adoption by judicial fiat, even if the court believes that the rule might once have been workable in the federal system. In the absence of express legislative intent, adoption risks serious harm to important state interests.
V. CONCLUSION
State courts reviewing their stands on McNabb-Malloy must consider not only whether to adopt the rule, but to what extent. Adopting a causation formula or a reasonableness standard leads to sporadic or ineffective application of the rule as evidenced in Michigan and Wisconsin. The per se rule based on flat time standards addresses the administrative problems, but may encourage police to continue their interrogations up to the limit in more cases, and abdicates the judicial function. Still, the rules in Pennsylvania and Maryland most accurately reflect the basic concerns of delay statutes. Perhaps a court should not decide between any of these options for enforcement. Although delay statutes express legislative intent, most of them provide no suggestions for methods of enforcement or remedies. 2t 7 The extension of a drastic remedy normally reserved for constitutional violations is a tenuously justified exercise of judicial power, especially in light of the reaction to the original rule in Congress. 2 1 8 Furthermore, current constitutional law addresses many of the original concerns underlying delay statutes, obviating the need for reliance on a doctrine of implied statutory exclusion. The Supreme Court now reads the fourth amendment practically to forbid the "pick-up" for questioning. 21 9 Once an accused is in custody, Miranda warnings must be given, understood, and voluntarily waived before a subsequent confession is admissible. 220 In any case, the confession must be voluntary. 22 ' The constitutional rulings undercut the delay statutes' protective function, which by itself supports a weak case for incurring the social cost of excluding the remaining confessions.
22 2
Yet the deterrent goal of McNabb-Mallog retains its validity with regard to prearraignment delays per se. The time one is kept at a police station illegally, whether or not he confesses, should be eliminated. But McNabb-Malloy applies only where police obtain a confession; even then it raises the general doubts about the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule. 223 An increasing number of courts are impatient with increased violations of delay statutes and, faced with a lack of legislative response, are considering action. 224 The recent state decisions to adopt McNabb-
